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1 Introduction
The review period covered in this contribution is mid-2016 until the 
end of April 2018 (the preceding update was M Reyneke ‘Child Justice: 
recent cases’ (2016) 29 SACJ 376). April 2018 marks 10 years into the 
implementation of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. The Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development has recently (in early 
2018) appointed a service provider to review the implementation of 
the Act, the findings of which will hopefully illuminate the successes 
and failures related to implementation. Current information on the 
implementation of the Act is limited to Departmental annual reports, 
the last of which was tabled in 2016/7.
Although the period under review is not an extensive one, it must 
be noted that cases in which higher courts have pronounced on 
aspects of the Child Justice Act remain, in the view of the author, 
rather few. In some high courts, there is no case law during the period 
under consideration. Whilst this phenomenon could be the product of 
seamless implementation of the Act’s provisions, it is rather probably 
related to the dwindling numbers of child justice cases entering the 
criminal justice system in the first place (see J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Child 
Justice’ in CJ Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa 2ed (2017) 725), 
coupled with the widespread use of diversion which then obviates 
further contact with the criminal justice system. According to the annual 
reports filed by the Department of Justice and other stakeholders on 
the implementation of the Child Justice Act, the numbers of charges 
against children aged below 18 years dropped from 75 000 in 2011/2012 
to 45 000 in 2015/6 (the South African Police Services do not keep 
data on the number of arrests, only on the number of charges). The 
declining numbers permeate all aspects of the child justice system: 
there are fewer children in diversion programmes, fewer assessments 
and preliminary inquiries, and fewer children’s trials being held. The 
question as to why the numbers of children in contact with the law 
has shrunk so markedly is one issue that the study team exploring the 
implementation of the Act will attempt to answer. 
172 SACJ . (2018) 1
2 Issues related to age and to criminal capacity
A few cases concerned errors in the age of accused which came to 
light during the course of the prosecution. In S v N (CA&R 15/2018) 
ZAECGHC 3 (16 June 2018), a special review in terms of s 304(4) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was brought on the basis 
that the accused had informed his legal representative as the trial 
commenced that he was a minor. School records confirmed that he 
was 17 years old, rather than 19 years old as recorded on the charge 
sheet. The review court set aside the proceedings that had taken place 
thus far in the East London District Court, in order for proceedings to 
recommence under the Child Justice Act. 
 In S v N (14/2016) [2016] ZANCHC 73 (28 October 2016), the docket 
recorded the age of an accused arrested for shoplifting six pairs of 
trousers as 18 years. He elected not to apply for bail and remained in 
police custody until he eventually tendered a guilty plea. In addressing 
the court on sentence, his Legal Aid attorney then submitted, as a 
mitigating factor, that the accused was only 17 years old. This was 
followed by several postponements to verify the date of birth of the 
accused, during which period the accused remained incarcerated, 
but at least then at a place of safety (now termed child and youth 
care centres, in accordance with the Children’s Act 38 of 2005). When 
his correct age was verified, the magistrate stopped proceedings and 
remitted the case for the conviction to be set aside. The magistrate 
expressed the view that prejudice had occurred insofar that the 
accused had not been diverted due to the oversight as to his true age 
on the part of his attorney. The court raised it as a cause for concern 
that the attorney seemed not to have realised the implications of the 
accused’s age, particularly in the context of the protection afforded 
child offenders in terms of the Child Justice Act (at para [6]): 
‘Even if the attorney had only after conviction become aware of the correct 
age of the accused, one would have expected him to have immediately 
addressed the Magistrate on the issue of prejudice and on the possible need 
to submit the case for review.’ 
Due to the relatively low value of the goods, the fact that they had 
been recovered upon his apprehension, and the fact that the accused 
was a first offender, the review court opined that the conclusion was 
inescapable that potential prejudice had been suffered due to the error 
in age, and non-consideration of diversion. However, the court said 
that in the circumstances it was unnecessary to consider whether 
the fact that an error regarding the age of an accused had resulted 
in diversion not being considered, would always lead to a finding of 
prejudice and to the setting aside of such a conviction (comparing the 
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case to S v Gani NO 2012 (2) SACR 468 (GSJ), which it did not regard 
as being comparable to this case). 
A further comment is apposite here: diversion could have been 
considered even though the accused’s age was recorded as 18 years, 
which would have eliminated the need for pre-trial custodial measures. 
Section 4(2)(b) of the Child Justice Act not only makes provision for 
the consideration of diversion for persons aged between 18 and under 
21 years, but so-called ‘adult diversion’ is in any event always available 
after temporary withdrawal of the charges. The detention of the child 
was hence unnecessary, and not a matter of last resort, and the fact 
that such detention was in a welfare facility rather than a correctional 
centre does not alter this.
In S v SP (unreported, RCD 117/2016; Review Judgment 16 February 
2017, High Court Ref: 780) the accused himself provided an incorrect 
age (19 years, instead of 17 years) upon his arrest for robbery with 
aggravating circumstances. The same age was provided to the presiding 
magistrate, earlier in the proceedings. The accused pleaded guilty and 
was convicted on the basis of his guilty plea given under s 112(2) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Only during sentencing did 
it emerge that he was still a minor. The magistrate placed on record 
that because the accused was a minor, certain pre-trial procedures 
should have been considered in terms of the Child Justice Act, 
including an assessment of the juvenile offender and consideration of 
the possibility of diversion. However, the court was of the view that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the accused was not properly assessed in 
accordance with the Child Justice Act, no undue prejudice was caused 
to him, particularly as the accused was in fact the cause of the error 
(at paras [7]-[8]). The matter was then adjourned, and the sentencing 
proceedings were conducted as provided for in terms of s 16 of the 
Child Justice Act: s 16(3) provides that, 
‘Subject to subsection (1), if a presiding officer is of the opinion that an error 
regarding age has not caused any prejudice to the person, the presiding 
officer must continue with the proceedings in terms of the provisions of this 
Act, in accordance with his or her age, as altered.’
A comprehensive pre-sentence report was filed and the accused’s 
probation officer recommended that the accused be sentenced to 
compulsory residence in a child youth care centre, as envisaged in 
s 76(1) of the Child Justice Act, but for a period of three years, which is 
below the statutorily prescribed period of five years (at para [15]). This 
sentence rendered the decision subject to automatic review in terms 
of s 85(1) of the Child Justice Act, in any event. It should however be 
noted that the review judge incorrectly characterised the maximum 
period of five years in a child and youth care centre provided for in 
s 76(1) as a ‘prescribed minimum period’.
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The review court considered whether any undue prejudice resulted 
from the error in the accused’s age, and whether, as a result, his right 
to a fair trial was infringed. The review court held that this did not 
occur, as the presiding officer had taken every precaution to ensure 
that there was due compliance with the provisions of the Child Justice 
Act once the true age of the child was known. 
In S v MM 2018 (1) SACR 18 (GP), the accused, who was legally 
represented, tendered a s 112(2) guilty plea. At the sentencing stage 
it was discovered that the accused was in fact under the age of 14 
when he committed the offence; however, the tendered plea contained 
no statement relating to his criminal capacity. Hence, the matter 
stood down for a special review. The Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions agreed that where an accused pleads guilty but is below 
the age of 14 years, an appropriate admission regarding criminal 
capacity must be contained in the s 112(2) plea, which relieves the 
state of the duty to prove criminal capacity. In the absence of such 
admission in casu, the conviction could not stand. 
However, there was a difference as regards the course of action the 
review court ought to take: either to set aside the conviction, or to 
remit the matter with the direction that the trial court record a s 113 
plea (which the lower court is empowered to do). The latter is the 
course of action that the review court took. However, the question that 
arises is the correctness of the prosecution’s view that an admission 
in a s 112(2) guilty plea can relieve the state of the obligation to prove 
that a child aged between 10 and under 14 years has criminal capacity. 
The Child Justice Act provides that the onus lies on the state to rebut 
the presumption of incapacity applicable to children of these ages; at 
minimum very comprehensive indications as to the child accused’s stage 
of development, level of education, appreciation of the wrongfulness 
of the act and ability to act in accordance with appreciation would 
need to be furnished in the s 112(2) guilty plea in order for the state to 
be relieved of the obligation to rebut the presumption (see S v TS 2015 
(1) SACR 489 (WCC), discussed in J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Recent cases: Child 
justice’ (2015) 28 SACJ 437). 
The review of the minimum age of criminal capacity envisaged in s 8 
of the Child Justice Act has taken place, but the report on the findings 
and potential amending legislation is yet to be tabled in Parliament.
3 Criminal charges involving non-South African children
S v HJ 2016 (1) SACR 629 (KZD) concerned a foreign-born migrant 
Malawian child, orphaned in South Africa. His conviction related to a 
contravention of s 49(1)(a) read with ss 1, 9, 10, 25, 26 and 32 of the 
Immigration Act 13 of 2002, in that he entered into, or remained in 
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South Africa without a valid permit. He had pleaded guilty, but before 
being sentenced informed the sentencing officer that he was 17 years of 
age (and not 18 years, as reflected on the charge sheet). The magistrate 
having been informed that the child’s parents were deceased and that 
he was living with a friend, remitted the matter for special review and 
ordered that the child be detained in Westville Correctional Facility. 
The magistrate confirmed at the time that he did not apply the Child 
Justice Act, and that the conviction could not stand.
As the review court points out, there is more to the matter than that: 
the accused is a minor, a foreign child whose parents are both dead 
and his only brush with the law, as far as is known, is his failure to 
be in possession of a valid permit to be in South Africa. The accused’s 
background, what became of his parents, how he entered South Africa, 
for what reason, how long he has been here, and who, if anyone, is 
caring for him are just some of the matters that require thorough 
investigation. Setting aside the conviction, the court referred to the 
constitutional standard of the best interests of the child (s 28(2)); the 
guiding principle set out in s 3(a) of the Child Justice Act to be taken 
into account that all consequences arising from the commission of an 
offence by a child should be proportionate to the circumstances of 
the child, the nature of the offence and the interests of society; and 
the need to consider diversion, which the court thought would be 
appropriate and in the interests of justice in this matter.
This last conclusion is not, in the circumstance, necessarily incorrect. 
However, it does beg the question concerning the interplay between the 
immigration and refugee regime, the child care and protection system, 
and the child justice/criminal justice system. There is considerable 
guidance to be had on this topic in international law (see, e.g., UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) ‘General comment No. 6 
(2005): Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside 
their Country of Origin’, 1 September 2005, (CRC/GC/2005/6); see, 
too, the recent ‘Joint General Comment No. 3 (2017) of the Committee 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families and No. 22 (2017) of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child on the general principles regarding the human rights 
of children in the context of international migration’ (CMW/C/GC/3-
CRC/C/GC/22); ‘Joint General Comment No. 4 (2017) of the Committee 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families’ and No. 23 (2017) of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child on State obligations regarding the human rights of children 
in the context of international migration in countries of origin, transit, 
destination and return’ (CMW/C/GC/4-CRC/C/GC/23). ‘Unaccompanied 
children (also called unaccompanied minors) are children who have 
been separated from both parents and other relatives and are not 
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being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible 
for doing so’ (‘General Comment 6: Treatment of unaccompanied 
and separated children outside their country of origin’, para 7). Such 
children may (or may not) qualify as asylum seekers, which would 
depend on whether they comply with the criteria set out in s 3(a), (b) 
or (c) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998). Section 3(a) of the Refugees 
Act states that a person qualifies for refugee status if that person is 
outside, and unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin, 
‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reasons of his or 
her race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of 
a particular social group,… is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of that country’. Section 3(b) of the Refugees 
Act applies to a person who flees his or her place of habitual residence 
as a result of external occupation, foreign domination, or events 
seriously disrupting public order. Section 3(c) of the Refugees Act 
allows for the dependant of the asylum seeker to derive similar status.
Accommodation of separated and unaccompanied children in 
alternative care is covered in para 40 of the General Comment cited 
above, which elaborates principles such as avoidance of deprivation of 
liberty, the necessity of keeping siblings together, and the desirability 
of continuity in a child’s upbringing. Article 20 of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which advocates for a range of alternative 
care placements to be available, is emphasised.
Turning to the relevant provisions in the Refugees Act, s 32 is 
apposite. It provides as follows:
‘(1) Any child who appears to qualify for refugee status in terms of section 3, 
and who is found under circumstances which clearly indicate that he or she 
is a child in need of care as contemplated in the Child Care Act, 1983 (Act 
No. 74 of 1983), must forthwith be brought before the Children‘s Court for 
the district in which he or she was found.
(2) The Children‘s Court may order that a child contemplated in subsection 
(1) be assisted in applying for asylum in terms of this Act.’
This confirms the legal position established in Centre for Child Law v 
Minister for Home Affairs 2005 (6) SA 50 (T), concerning the immigration 
detention of a group of foreign children pending deportation. The court 
there held that unaccompanied children must first be brought before a 
children’s court for a determination as to whether they are in need of 
care and protection, before they are returned to their country of origin 
(if they do not qualify to apply for asylum). The Department of Social 
Development’s Guidelines on Dealing with Migrant Children (2011) 
state that unaccompanied [foreign] children should be assumed to be 
children ‘in need of care and protection’. The circumstances in which 
unaccompanied children are found and brought to court, commonly 
results in placement in alternative care. (Alternative care placement 
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includes placement in child and youth care centres as provided for 
in the Children’s Act, temporary safe care placements and foster care 
placements; as J Sloth-Nielsen and M Ackermann demonstrate in 
their socio-legal study, placements in alternative care frequently do 
not lead to family reunification or durable solutions (J Sloth-Nielsen 
J and M Ackermann ‘Unaccompanied and separated children in the 
care system in the Western Cape: a socio-legal study’ (2016) 19 PELJ 1.) 
This is to ensure that appropriate investigations as to the child’s home 
circumstances are undertaken, as part and parcel of a best interests 
determination as to the solution to be arrived at. A recent case in 
which the primacy of the children’s court route was confirmed, was 
Mubake v Minister of Home Affairs 2016 (2) SA 220 (GP), albeit that the 
facts of this case differed wholly from the present example. 
Hence, the assumption that diversion might be the appropriate 
route is not good in law or in practice: the unaccompanied child 
would have to have been referred to the children’s court, as is now 
accepted, and the National Director of Public Prosecutions directives 
(GN R252, GG 33067, 31 March 2010) state that diversion of matters 
before the preliminary inquiry should not take place in (for example) 
circumstances where the child ‘has been abandoned or orphaned, and 
is without visible means of support’ (Directive G6(c)). 
A final point concerns the referral of the child to the Westville 
Correctional Centre, where he was held for a month after his true 
age became known, pending the special review of the erroneous 
conviction. In the light of the Constitutional Court decision in Lawyers 
for Human Rights v Minister for Home Affairs (CCT 38/16) [2017] ZACC 
22; 2017 (10) BCLR 1242 (CC); 2017 (5) SA 480 (CC) (29 June 2017) 
in which administrative detention pending deportation (s 32 of the 
Immigration Act) was found to be unconstitutional, and given that 
the circumstances enumerated indicated that the child accused in this 
matter had an address at which he lived, the detention order must be 
regarded as questionable. It smacks of a form of deportation detention 
‘by the back door’ as it were. As Japhta J noted in Lawyers for Human 
Rights supra (at para [33]),
‘[t]his right [s 12(1)(b) of the Constitution] outlaws arbitrary detentions. 
There must be a rational connection between the detention and an 
objectively determinable and legitimate governmental purpose. Absence 
of that connection would mean that the substantive aspect of the right is 
breached. A breach of this aspect of the right may also occur where a rational 
connection exists but the purpose or cause for the detention is not just.’ 
Admittedly the section impugned in that case related to the powers 
of immigration officials and the non-necessity of a court appearance, 
whilst detention in the S v HJ (supra) matter was sanctioned by a court, 
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but the further overriding constitutional principle of detention of 
children as a matter of last resort is still applicable (s 28(1)(g)).
4 Failure to hold a preliminary inquiry
S v N (R431/2017) [2017] ZAFSHC 202 (26 October 2017) resulted in 
an approach that cannot be supported. The accused, arrested for 
possession of housebreaking implements when they were 17 years 
of age, were served with a notice to appear before a preliminary 
inquiry on 25 April 2013. However, it appeared that such inquiry was 
never conducted, nor were they assessed. The accused appeared in 
court again on a summons issued in terms of s 54 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act four years later, by which time they were now 20 years 
old.
The matter was remitted on special review (s 304(4) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act) after conviction, but prior to sentencing, because the 
magistrate was of the opinion that a failure of justice might have 
occurred due to the preliminary inquiry that had not been convened. 
After citing various sections of the Child Justice Act related to when 
proceedings fall to be dealt with in terms of this statute (s 4(2)(a)), 
factors prosecutors should consider in relation to decisions around 
diversion (ss 51 and 52), when assessment must take place (s 5(2)), and 
when a preliminary inquiry must be held (s 5(3)) – the court concluded 
that the irregularity in this case was not of such a nature that it per se 
resulted in a failure of justice. 
Motivating this conclusion, that court said as follows (at paras 
[21]-[22]): 
‘The accused’s legal guardians were notified when the accused were arrested 
at age 17. The legal guardians signed the written notices that were served 
on the accused. The accused had a legal representative throughout the trial. 
The accused’s version of the events that was put to the state witnesses was 
an indication that accused 4 and 5 clearly understood the charges against 
them and the proceedings of the trial. The absence of a preliminary inquiry 
therefore does not result in a gross irregularity in respect of accused 4 and 5.’ 
This judgment is objectionable for three reasons. First, the learned 
judge has failed wholly to understand that the preliminary inquiry 
is no mere procedural device (see J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Paperweight 
or powertool: a critical appraisal of the potential of the proposed 
preliminary inquiry procedure’ (2004) 6(2) Article 40 3-5). The central 
purposes of the preliminary inquiry are to consider, with the aid of 
the assessment report, the possibility of diversion (as well as release 
or placement if the child is in custody, which was not the case in 
this matter, as the accused had been served a notice to appear at 
the preliminary inquiry and were clearly no longer in custody). 
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Having bypassed the preliminary inquiry procedure, the opportunity 
to be considered for diversion was foregone. The whole point of a 
separate criminal process for person below the age of 18 (as set out 
in detail in the objects of the Act) is wholly undermined if convictions 
without the prior opportunity to appear before a preliminary inquiry 
are effectively condoned. The benefits that the accused should have 
enjoyed due their being aged below 18 at the time of commission of 
the offence are nullified, not least of which is the opportunity to avoid 
having a criminal record.
Second, the judicial condonation extends to what is an unexplained 
but ultimately objectionable bureaucratic set of facts. The court said 
that Exhibits B and C of the record showed that accused 4 and 5 were 
given notices to appear at a preliminary inquiry on 25 April 2013. 
Exhibit D of the record book J546, shows both accused names were 
entered in a preliminary enquiry (at para [13]). Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the preliminary inquiry did not take place as scheduled. The failure 
to follow up on the fact that for a period of four years, the scheduled 
preliminary enquiry did not take place escapes without any adverse 
comment from the bench, although the Child Justice Act’s provisions 
relating to the need for speedy finalisation of trials involving children 
are cited by the judge (at para [19]). Moreover, the resuscitation of 
charges and the issuance of a summons four years on does raise some 
concerns about the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
to pursue the matter (seemingly with vigour, since the charges were 
contested by the accused).
Third, the line of reasoning employed in this judgment could have 
the consequence that the state is incentivised to delay convening 
preliminary inquiries until after accused children turn 18. They are 
then permitted to pursue charges at a suitable later date (as long as 
4  years later!), outside the purview of the child justice system, and 
with no sanction pertaining to any form of irregularity. Such actions 
would be in direct contrast with the intention of the legislature in 
enacting a separate child justice statute. 
In the event, the conviction was upheld and the matter remitted to 
the trial court for sentence. 
In S v DW 2017 (1) SACR 336 (NCK), the accused was 17 years and 
11 months at the time of the commission of the offence, but was not 
assessed prior to appearing before court for trial. The offender was 
legally represented. He pleaded guilty to the charge in terms of s 112(2) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act, which plea was accepted by the 
prosecutor. From the presiding officer’s questioning it became 
apparent that the offence committed was in fact housebreaking with 
intent to trespass, and trespass. His age become apparent only at 
the sentencing stage, whereupon he was sentenced to R1500 or five 
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months’ imprisonment, which was wholly suspended for five years on 
conditions. ‘The issue for determination is whether the failure by the 
court, to implement the Child Justice Act prior to the commencement 
of the trial, vitiates the proceedings’, according to the review court (at 
para [7]).
If the Child Justice Act were correctly applied to this case, seeing that 
the child offender was below the age of 18 when he was arrested, the 
role players would have ensured that (1) his needs and circumstances 
were assessed (2) he was provided special circumstances or procedures 
to secure his attendance at court and (3) an ‘informal, inquisitorial, 
pretrial procedure, designed to facilitate the disposal of his case in 
his best interests, by considering the diversion of his matter and 
keeping him away from the criminal proceedings, having properly 
assessed whether the circumstances of his case warranted same, was 
created’ (at para [8]). The court stated explicitly that the accused was 
deprived of a preliminary inquiry and the possibility of diversion. Had 
an assessment been conducted immediately after he was charged, he 
would in all probability have been diverted, according to the review 
court (at para [15]). Did this result in a failure of justice in accordance 
with established principles?
In the view of the court, the answer was no, for three reasons. The 
accused was only a month short of his 18th birthday when the offence 
was committed; his rights to legal representation were explained to 
him; he availed himself of the legal aid offered and, apart from the 
lapse of this person in establishing his true age at the time of the 
commission of the offence, he enjoyed competent legal representation 
and pleaded guilty. In the view of the court, a retrial where there has 
not been shown to have been a gross irregularity vitiating the trial 
would be improper and unprocedural.
However, the court did interfere with the sentence, replacing the 
fine with alternative imprisonment with a caution and discharge. 
Whilst mindful of the need for finalisation of matters, the same 
comments can be made as regards condoning the absence of procedures 
specifically designed by the legislature for criminal procedures 
involving persons who were under the age of 18 years at the time of 
the commission of the offence as were made in regard to the previous 
case. Assessment might have brought to light the underlying reasons 
surrounding the accused engaging in trespassing (which could relate 
to social welfare issues: the review judge is possibly aware of this, 
as amongst the persons upon whom a copy of the judgement was 
ordered to be furnished were staff at the provincial Department of 
Social Development); and he now has a criminal record which could 




Up for consideration in P v S (CA 152/2016) [2017] ZAECGHC 2 (10 January 
2017), was the sentence imposed for six counts (housebreaking with 
intent to commit robbery and murder, murder, attempted murder, 
robbery with aggravating circumstances, and unlawful possession of 
firearms), committed in what was essentially a ‘farm murder’ of two 
elderly inhabitants (the charge for the second victim was attempted 
murder). Accused 1 was 13 years of age at the time of commission of 
the offences. His sentence was an effective 10 years’ imprisonment. 
He appealed the sentence as unjust and shockingly inappropriate and 
severe in view of the following factors: his youthful age when the 
offences were committed; no previous convictions; he only actively 
participated in the offences after the victims had been incapacitated; 
he did not assault any of the victims; there was no evidence of 
premeditation in respect of the offence of murder, attempted murder 
and robbery; he pleaded guilty and gave a credible plea explanation. 
It was further submitted that the sentencing court below neglected to 
consider the effect of the period of 1 year and 2 months spent by the 
appellant in custody awaiting trial.
Citing s 77(5) of the Child Justice Act, the appeal court conceded 
that the sentencing court had not considered ante-dating the sentence 
imposed by a period equal to the period spent in custody prior 
to sentencing, as the legislation then required (this section was 
substituted by s 4(d) of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 14 of 
2014; it now provides that ‘[a] child justice court imposing a sentence 
of imprisonment must take into account the number of days that the 
child has spent in prison or a child and youth care centre prior to the 
sentence being imposed’).
 Regarding the question as to the appropriateness of an effective 
prison sentence of 10 years, the appeal court had regard to s 69(4) of 
the Child Justice Act, which refers amongst others to the need to consider 
the seriousness of the offence, the harm caused by the offence, the 
culpability of the child in causing or risking the harm, the protection of 
the community, the severity of the impact of the offence on the victim, 
and the desirability of keeping the child out of prison (at para [10]). This 
was a very serious attack, and the impact upon the victim, her family 
and the community was detailed during sentencing stage. The appeal 
court was persuaded that the sentence imposed was proportional 
to the crime, the offender and the needs of the society and was the 
shortest possible period in the circumstances. Moreover, the court was 
not prepared to substitute the sentence of direct imprisonment with a 
sentence to be served in a child and youth care centre.
In S v K (A539/17) [2017] ZAGPPHC 102 (10 October 2017) the 
accused child was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment for malicious 
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damage to property after he ‘aggressively pushed a door and the glass 
broke’. The accused, who was legally represented, pleaded guilty and a 
pre-sentence report was presented. On review, the court asked for 
reasons for the choice of this sentence, and whether alternative 
sentences were considered. At para [4], the review court explains the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence:
‘At the time of the commission of the offence, the accused was an in-patient 
at a treatment centre for drug addiction. On the day in question the accused 
was in the dining room. After having been verbally reprimanded by a 
caretaker, the apparently agitated accused, in leaving the room, pushed a 
glass door, breaking the glass and cutting his hand in the process.’
The probation officer had recommended that the sentence the court 
imposed should be suspended on condition that the accused should be 
treated as an inpatient at a named treatment centre in order to address 
his substance abuse.
The review court found several factors relative to the lower court 
proceedings which pointed to a failure of justice: the seeming triviality 
of the offence; the failure to consider that, from the version of the 
accused it seems that he did not have dolus directus, and that the form 
of mens rea was dolus eventualis; and the direct sentence of 2 years’ 
imprisonment was not commensurate with the nature and extent of the 
crime, and was shockingly inappropriate. The conviction was confirmed, 
but the sentence set aside and replaced with a caution and discharge.
In B v S (A481/16) [2017] ZAWCHC 18; 2017 (1) SACR 553 (WCC) 
(23 February 2017) an effective 19-year sentence imposed on a person 
who was 16 at the time of the commission of the offences of one count 
of murder, two counts of attempted murder, one count of possession 
of an unlicensed firearm and one count of possession of ammunition 
was challenged. Although the sentence was confirmed on automatic 
review, to which is was subject in terms of s 85 of the Child Justice 
Act, it was subsequently appealed. While it was contended that it was 
appropriate for the trial court to impose a long term of imprisonment 
given that from the facts his conduct was premeditated and he showed 
no remorse, it was material that the appellant was 16 years old when 
he committed the offences and was 18 when he was sentenced. The 
state conceded that the sentence was not imposed ‘for the shortest 
appropriate period of time’ as required by the Child Justice Act and that 
some of the sentences should run concurrently to produce an effective 
term of 13 years’ imprisonment. The appeal court cited the dictum in 
S v N 2008 (2) SACR 135 (SCA) at para [39], to the effect that prison 
must be a last resort for a child offender and where unavoidable, its 
form and duration should also be tempered on the basis that ‘(e)very 
day he spent in prison should be because there is no alternative’ (at 
para [23]). The court (at para [25]) also referred to S v BF 2012 (1) SACR 
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298 (SCA) at paras [13] and [14] where the trial court was found to 
have over-emphasised the seriousness of the offences at the expense 
of the youthfulness of the offender in sentencing a 14-year-old to 25 
years’ imprisonment, a sentence which was found to be ‘disturbingly 
inappropriate’. In addition, a misdirection was committed in failing 
to take into account the cumulative effect of the sentences or to order 
that the sentences imposed, or part thereof, run concurrently.
The court concluded that, given the grave nature of the offences 
committed in this matter, their cumulative effect insofar as there were 
three victims on the same scene and the absence of any explanation 
as to the motive, nor any sign of remorse shown, a custodial sentence 
is the only appropriate sentence in the circumstances of the matter. 
However, the effective sentence of 19 years’ imprisonment was 
regarded as startlingly inappropriate, and it (at para [30]), 
‘does not reflect an appropriate regard to the imposition of a sentence for 
the shortest appropriate time and in my mind visits a punishment on the 
appellant which is so long for a young person that it does little to allow the 
offender to keep the hope of a different life, outside of a world of crime, 
alive.’
The cumulative sentences were therefore reduced to an effective 
13 years’ imprisonment. 
A v S (42/2015) [2016] ZANCHC 5, (15 April 2016) related to a 
conviction for rape of a child who was 15 years old at the time of the 
commission of the offence. He was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment 
and it was ordered that he serve his sentence in the Bosasa Youth and 
Child Care Centre in De Aar until he reached the age of 21 years, when 
the court would, upon receipt of a report from the centre, consider 
whether further imprisonment would be appropriate. The magistrate 
imposing this sentence conceded that the sentence was incorrectly 
formulated and, therefore, not competent. Section 76(1) of the Child 
Justice Act provides for a sentence of ‘compulsory residence’ in a child 
and youth care centre; not for a sentence of imprisonment to be served 
at such a centre, as the court noted (at para [11]):
‘That a sentence of imprisonment is to be distinguished from a sentence 
of compulsory residence at such a centre is evident from the provisions of 
section 76(3)(a) of the Act, which provides that a sentence of imprisonment, 
to be served after completion of the period of compulsory residence in a 
child and youth care centre, may be imposed “in addition to” a sentence of 
compulsory residence in such a centre’. 
According to the review court, ‘[s]uch additional imprisonment may 
only be imposed “if substantial and compelling reasons exist” which 
would justify it, and then “only … as a measure of last resort and for 
the shortest appropriate period of time”’. Even then the need for such 
an additional sentence of imprisonment to be served will, in terms 
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of s 76(3)(b) and (c), have to be reconsidered upon completion of the 
period of compulsory residence at the centre (at para [12]).
The regional magistrate had stated that he intended the accused to 
remain in the centre until the age of 21 years, but also to impose an 
additional sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment in view of the seriousness 
of the offence. It was not clear that the regional magistrate was aware 
of the requirement of substantial and compelling reasons for such 
an additional sentence of imprisonment and, if so, what the regional 
magistrate considered to be such reasons. The review court found 
many mitigating factors, such as the accused’s limited intellectual 
capacity and his particularly small physique, his age at the time of the 
commission of the offence, plea of guilty and lack of prior convictions. 
The social worker had recommended only compulsory residence as a 
sentence and had advised against the imposition of imprisonment. The 
sentence was therefore set aside and the matter remitted for the fresh 
imposition of sentence in the light of the above.
S v M (34/2016) [2016] ZAFSHC 67 (12 May 2016) concerned a 
conviction of a 17-year-old upon a s 112(2) plea of guilty for theft 
of cash in the amount of R1666 and cigarettes to the value of R265, 
leading to the imposition of a sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment 
wholly suspended on conditions for 5 years. However, s 77 of the Child 
Justice Act requires a pre-sentence report prepared by a probation 
officer, even where a sentence of imprisonment is suspended. The 
review court held that it was satisfied that the conviction is in order, 
but ordered that the matter should be re-submitted to the magistrate 
to ensure that a pre-sentence report is obtained and considered before 
the accused is sentenced afresh.
6 Anonymity of child accused (and victims and witnesses)
Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Ltd 2017 (2) SACR 416 (GP) concerned 
the dilemma of protection of the identity of a child accused, child 
victims and child witnesses after they reach the age of 18 years. 
Occasioned initially by the well-publicised matter of the baby (known 
as Zephany Nurse in the media) who was kidnapped whilst a few 
days old, and raised as her own child by the kidnapper, until her 
true parents discovered her identity when she was 17 years of age, 
the constitutional challenge was brought to s 154(3) of the Criminal 
Procedure concerning the protection of the identity of child. It was 
contended that insofar as she was about to turn 18 years of age, s 154 
appeared not to provide anonymity to a child victim, initially under 
the age of 18, after she turned 18 years of age; and, if the victim 
was not a witness in the matter (the kidnapping charge, in which she 
ultimately did not testify against the woman who had raised her), she 
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would enjoy no protection under s 154. Further, it was argued that 
s 63(6) of the Child Justice Act (which refers to the applicability of the 
provisions of s 154 of the Criminal Procedure Act with regards to the 
publication of information identifying an accused person), similarly 
failed to protect a child accused’s anonymity after he or she turned 18.
Countering this, the media respondents submitted that open justice 
is the default position, and that it is not for the courts to impose 
exceptions on the open justice principle, as this falls in the domain 
of Parliament. It was common cause that a number of constitutional 
rights are at play against each other. On the one hand are the rights 
of the child, especially those found in s 28(2), that the child’s best 
interests are paramount; the right to dignity found in s 10; the right to 
equality in s 9; the right to privacy in s 14; and the right to a fair trial 
found in s 35(3) of the Constitution. On the other hand, are the rights 
of the media and the public, such as the right to freedom of expression 
in terms of s 16 of the Constitution, and the right to open justice in 
terms of s 152 of the Criminal Procedure Act (at para [29]).
The applicants argued that,
 ‘…the protection afforded by s 28(2) makes provision for the “principle of 
ongoing protection” to children. This protection does not then cease when 
the child attains the age of 18, as the lifelong consequences of the child’s 
action and experience are felt in adulthood.’ (at para [33]).
The applicant (at para [31]) referred to J v NDPP 2014 (2) SACR 1 (CC) 
at para [43]: 
‘The impact of registration is reduced in practical terms and varies according 
to the particular child’s circumstances and age. However, this court has 
held that consequences for the criminal conduct of a child that extend into 
adulthood (such as minimum sentences) do implicate children’s rights.’ 
Countering this contention, the respondents stressed that the best 
interests of the child as enshrined in s 28(2) of the Constitution did 
not trump other rights nor was it an absolute right (at para [36]), 
citing S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) 539 
(CC). The media argued that the language used in s 154(3) does not 
include a victim who is not a witness in criminal proceedings. The 
default position proposed by the media lies in s 152, the open justice 
principle, meaning criminal proceedings are to be held in open court, 
with exceptions where the victim is a victim of sexual offences and 
related cases (s 153(3)).
Regarding the failure to protect child victims who were not witnesses, 
the court held, on a purposive reading of s 154(3), that the purpose 
found in s 154(3) is such that it heralds the best interests of the child, 
whether the child is an accused, complainant, witness or victim in 
criminal proceedings; it is that purpose that highlights the scope of 
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the right to be found within s 154(3). That does not, in the view of 
the judge, render s 154(3) unconstitutional, but did permit an order 
extending the protection of s 154(3) to victims of crime who were aged 
below 18 years (at para [63]).
As regards the child’s anonymity continuing beyond 18 years, the 
court found that it was not empowered to change an age as stipulated 
in the section (at para [62]). That function is ascribed to the legislature. 
The fact that s 154(3) provides protection until the age of 18 as enacted 
by the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, as it is not just and 
equitable. But the court, citing the specificity of ages in legislation 
such as the Child Justice Act (where for instance a child is defined as 
‘any person under the age of 18 years and, in certain circumstances, 
means a person who is 18 years or older but under the age of 21 
years whose matter is dealt with in terms of s 4(2)’ militated against a 
reading broader than the stated age of 18 years for protection of the 
child’s identity.
Ultimately, as regards anonymity, the court reasoned that there 
cannot be open-ended protection in favour of children, even into their 
adulthood. This would violate the rights of other parties and the other 
rights of the children themselves when they are adults. The court 
justifies this by way of the following example (at para [67]):
‘… a child, having been involved in a crime, either as an accused, victim, 
complainant or witness, as an adult […] might seek to highlight awareness 
of their experience with others. This would not be possible, whether it 
was to bring awareness to others or purely to highlight the plight of such 
experience, as there would be a gag on such publication, if the protection 
is open ended even into adulthood. This would simply amount to stifling 
the adult’s right of freedom of expression. This in my mind takes away an 
individual’s right as an adult.’
It would further certain constitutional rights, such as privacy, whilst 
working against others, like freedom of expression. Hence it was 
declared that the ‘adult extension’ of the anonymity of protected 
children that was sought, fell to be dismissed, on the basis that it is 
neither permissible nor required by the Constitution.
This means that an accused person such as Don Steenkamp 
(convicted of killing his family in the so-called Griekwastad murders) 
(S v DD (K/S 46/2012) [2014] ZANCHC 9 (27 March 2014)), whose 
identity was protected until he turned 18, forfeits the benefit of the 
protection upon reaching 18 years of age (as in fact happened in this 
instance when a book was published detailing his life history on the 
day of his 18th birthday). However, it is reported that the judgment in 
this matter is being appealed.
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